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The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement
system is intended to be the central pillar of the international trade
system by which trade disputes involving WTO member states are adjudicated,1 whether regarding trade in goods, services, or in intellectual property rights.2 However, an innocuous statement such as this,
when closely considered, indicates potential problems for the system.
The WTO is an international treaty-based organization, established in
* J.D. candidate, 2010, University of Richmond School of Law.
1
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes A
Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.
htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
2
See Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1154 (1994); General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1167 (1994); Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994).
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1994 by 123 countries in Marrakesh, Morocco.3 In addition to settling
disputes in international trade, the WTO is also a negotiating forum
and a set of rules.4 The organization is more than a “table” for its
member states, as the WTO website implies: the set of rules includes
common principles, which translate into purposes for the organization.5 These include non-discrimination (i.e., treating domestic products no more favorably than imported products), free trade,
predictability, fair competition, and the encouragement of economic
development.6
Yet, as a voluntary political organization, any judicial enforcement of its actions will not come without controversy.7 Thus, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO cannot act in a traditional
judicial sense since such judicial decisions are binding only because
autonomous member states have agreed that they be binding.8 Even
the process by which the system was established was inherently political, and such politics are expected to, and do, permeate the system’s
functioning.9
The WTO functions with an understanding of its own limitations. The dispute settlement mechanism’s actions are administrative
and decided by a system of arbitration. It is not an international
equivalent of a domestic common (or civil) law court, but an economic
creation with a political end. Considering the natural autonomy of its
members and the ends of the organization, including the disposal of
disputes, natural inequities will not be easily resolved. If the WTO
intends to pursue its stated principles, then it should be aware of these
natural inequities and appropriately deal with them.10 This is the
problem of fairness, and it reveals itself in the dispute settlement
3

World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Uruguay Round, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2010) [hereinafter Uruguay Round].
4
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: What is the WTO?, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2010).
5
Id.
6
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading
System, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
7
Debra P. Steger, The Future of the WTO: The Case for Institutional Reform, 12
J. INT’L. ECON. L. 803, 803–04 (2009).
8
Id. at 806.
9
Id.
10
Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L. ECON. L.
861, 862 (2005), available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/4/
861?ijkey=sctstP41iBTuveY&keytype=ref (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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mechanism, particularly in the treatment of developed versus developing nations.
The system as it stands intends simply to “deal with” natural
inequities within the system, mitigating unfair advantages, rather
than structuring the system so that inequities do not translate into
advantage and disadvantage.11 The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), the guiding document for the dispute settlement system,
allows for “special procedures involving least-developed country members” in certain areas.12 Philosophically, the DSU reveals intent to
balance two competing tendencies, egalitarian liberalism and libertarian liberalism, in trying to reach an optimal agreement for the system
to function. An examination of this system reveals problems and the
need for a solution.
I. THE SYSTEM AS IT STANDS
A. The WTO Dispute Settlement System
The DSU, signed on April 15, 1994, along with other documents, decisions, and understandings, was part of the finalizing act of
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.13 The Uruguay Round,
named for the country in which the first meeting was held in 1986,
was the set of trade negotiations that formally created the WTO.14
The idea for the Uruguay Round began in 1982 at a ministerial meeting of GATT members in Geneva.15 Up to that point, the organization
had been called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or
GATT, and its jurisdiction extended only to trade in goods.16 With the
establishment of the WTO, the organization agreed to negotiate trade
in other areas, particularly in services and intellectual property.17 Politically, the organization was restructured, and the dispute settle11

See generally Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 CHI. KENT. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 130 (describing why developing
countries shy away from participating in disputes or are unable to access the dispute settlement system).
12
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm [hereinafter DSU].
13
Uruguay Round, supra note 3.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_
e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
17
Uruguay Round, supra note 3.
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ment system underwent changes as prescribed by the DSU.18 Under
GATT, dispute settlement was largely another negotiation function of
the body, and decisions were products of political capital.19 That process was based on diplomacy, and the system that emerged from the
DSU was rule-based.20 Particularly, decisions made were automatically binding, and countries were given an automatic right of review to
the Appellate Body.21 Such measures were intended to be helpful to
developing nations who had less to bargain with in terms of political or
economic capital under the GATT system.
By partially judicializing the system, the WTO “table,” at least
as far as dispute settlement matters relating to developing countries,
was thought to have been made more equitable. Although such measures wrongly assumed developing nations would be willing to use the
system to resolve their trade disputes, the DSU’s new measures can be
viewed as an attempt to mitigate natural inequities. It assumes that if
efforts are taken to put developing nations in the same place at the
beginning of a dispute as developed nations, they have no reason to act
differently. There are two problems that arise in evaluating the fairness of the dispute settlement system as it stands. First, it does not do
enough to fully mitigate obstacles developing nations face when entering the international trade regime. Second, its philosophical underpinnings do not allow it to alleviate more essential problems, including
the problem of participation and the consequences that result from the
way trade disputes work out for developing nations, given their special
circumstances. If the system is reformed according to a legal pragmatism model, basing its function on a non-philosophical and goal-oriented meaning of fairness and targeting those more essential issues
(particularly participation), secondary issues will take care of
themselves.
B. Developing Nation Special and Differential Treatment
The DSU gives “special and differential treatment” to developing nations in a number of ways. These privileges occur at various
stages of the dispute resolution process and are intended to alleviate
some of the problems that naturally occur for developing nations, including the lack of experts on particular trade issues and the long18

World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_
e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
19
Timothy Stostad, Note, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute Settlement in the WTO, and Its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
811, 812 (2006).
20
Id.
21
Id.
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term financial strain of dedicating resources to resolving disputes.22
First, the DSU provides for special and differential treatment during
consultations. This is the first stage of the dispute resolution process,
where parties are required to negotiate a resolution to the dispute
before a panel is involved. The DSU instructs members (of the WTO)
to give “special attention” to the particular problems and interest of
developing countries if they are involved in the dispute.23 The parties
are required to indicate on a form exactly how these special considerations were made. The DSU also provides two ways that the period for
consultation may extend beyond its normal length of sixty days:24 The
parties may mutually agree to extend the period or the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) chairperson may extend the period.25
Normally, the panel stage comes after consultation, assuming
parties are not able to reach a consensus on how to dispose of the dispute. The DSB, comprised of all members of the WTO, has the authority to establish panels to hear disputes. If a developing country is a
party to the dispute, at least one of the three panel members must be
from a developing country.26 If the respondent is a developing country, the DSU instructs the panel to ensure the nation has sufficient
time to prepare and present its defense, though there is no provision
for the time period provided to be extended.27 The panel is required to
explicitly indicate on a form if a developing nation raises issues of special and differential treatment and how consideration was made.28
Special and differential treatment also extends to the implementation stage after the panel has reached a decision. Implementation includes guaranteeing that the “losing” party acts upon the
panel’s decision as well as the withdrawal of violative trade mechanisms, compensation for loss, and, as a last resort, the suspension of
an obligation of the opposing party equivalent to the loss of that party
as was adjudged by the dispute body.29 Here again, the DSU requires
special consideration be given to issues of developing nations.30 The
DSB is required to give consideration to the way implementation is
22

World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.int/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s1p1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
23
DSU, supra note 12, art. 4.10.
24
Id. art. 4.7.
25
Id. art. 12.10.
26
Id. art. 8.10.
27
Id. art. 12.10.
28
Id. art. 12.11.
29
Id. art. 3.7.
30
Id. art. 21.2.
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managed in a developing nation, what measures would be appropriate,
and their impact on the member state’s economy.31
The previously mentioned provisions are primarily intended
for developing nations that are respondents in a dispute and need additional time to defend themselves. When developing nations are complainants, they have the right to invoke Article 3.12, which allows for
accelerated procedures through the entire process as prescribed by the
WTO decision of April 5, 1966.32 These special procedures allow for
additional considerations available to developing nations, including
post-consultation dispute facilitation by the WTO Director-General,
the consideration of special circumstances of the developing nation at
the panel stage, and a shortened time period for the panel to submit its
report.33
Beyond these provisions, additional allowances are set out in
the DSU for the least-developed countries. Special circumstances
must be considered at all stages, not just at the panel and implementation stages, and developed states are urged to use restraint in seeking
compensation.34 The Director-General must also be available at all
stages of the dispute settlement process to consult and facilitate equitable resolutions.35
Finally, the WTO provides assistance for developing countries’
lack of legal expertise. The organization Secretariat provides legal assistance because they are required to provide developing nations a legal expert if requested.36 But, there are conflict of interest issues, and
therefore, limitations for WTO employees consulting for developing
nations, so the WTO allows for private legal counsel to be employed in
cases of a dispute.37 The WTO also has established the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, an agency independent from the WTO that can provide assistance in dispute matters.38

31

Id. arts. 21.7–21.8.
Decision of 5 April 1966 on Procedures under Article XXII, GATT B.I.S.D. (14th
Supp.) at 18 (1967).
33
Id.
34
DSU, supra note 12, art. 24.1.
35
Id. art. 24.2.
36
Id. art. 27.2.
37
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Developing Countries in Dispute Settlement—Special and Differential Treatment,
http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s2p2_e.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
38
Id.
32
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II. IS THE SYSTEM FAIR?
Do these provisions serve their purpose? The intent of this special and differential treatment of developing nations is to mitigate natural, and thus “unfair,” advantages of developed nations. If the goal is
to make the proceedings fair, or as fair as possible, then what do we
mean by fair? Are there external goals to be accomplished by fairness?
Traditionally, the fairness of these provisions has been evaluated using the opposing standards of egalitarian liberalism and libertarian
liberalism.
Why liberalism? WTO academic study has all but assumed
that “liberal” would be an appropriate philosophical characterization
of the organization and its purpose. When considering the issue of
fairness of the dispute resolution mechanism, the characterization
takes on a strikingly more active meaning than might be assumed.
Scholars have viewed liberalism, in this context, as a “theory of justice,
a view about the justifications of social arrangements.”39 What justifications are appropriate would then be the main point of contention
between differing views of liberalism, particularly egalitarian and libertarian liberalism.40 The form of this justification would take that of
the consent of the governed, following a social contract theory. To
what have the people agreed,41 or, in the case of the WTO, to what
have the members agreed? This is what the philosophical approaches
strive to answer.
The two approaches have been criticized, however, on several
grounds. By evaluating fairness using a philosophical standard, there
is a natural presumption of neutrality as to any favoring of developed
or developing states.42 The philosophical approaches also do not consistently take into account the consequences of WTO actions by its
members.43
A. What is Fair?
1. Egalitarian and Libertarian Liberalism
Egalitarian liberalism stands on one end of the spectrum in
evaluating what it means for the WTO dispute settlement system to be
fair concerning the special treatment of developing nations. This eval39

Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing
World, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975, 996 (1999).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
JAMES GATHII, FAIRNESS AS FIDELITY TO MAKING THE WTO FULLY RESPONSIVE
TO ALL ITS MEMBERS 1, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=594485.
43
Id.
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uation originates from the thought of John Rawls, an American philosopher, and would see the benefits and burdens of the trading system
equally disbursed, bearing in mind what Rawls called the “difference
principle,” which would give special consideration to vulnerable members.44 This principle, derived from his thought that inequitable distribution of what he called “social primary goods,” was not justified
and must be undone.45 Thus, the egalitarian liberal approach would
favor developing nations in doling out benefits and burdens, eliminating any natural advantages of developed nations and disadvantages of
developing nations. The approach appears ends-focused, considering
non-trade issues that might affect a developing country’s ability to respond to a dispute settlement proceeding.46 Members are thus viewed
as rights holders, not just economic bodies.47 The egalitarian liberal
would demand that developing nations receive equal benefits in the
end. The current system would be criticized for not doing enough to
mandate removal of all advantages of developed nations. Frank Garcia, an egalitarian proponent, notes, “[I]f . . . the principle of special
and differential treatment is key to the justification of inequality, then
adequate implementation of the principle . . . is equally important for
the creation of a just trading system.”48 The opportunity to succeed is
not justice or fairness; success is.
Libertarian liberalism, on the other hand, considers WTO
members solely economic beings, and considerations are all self-contained.49 Non-trade issues are not considered in dispensing fairness.50
Rather than being ends-focused, libertarian liberalism demands fairness be accomplished by procedural equality and by equality of opportunity.51 This is because morality to the libertarian is a matter of
rights, not of equality.52 Rights would demand a return of developing
and developed nations to their original positions, not their end positions as egalitarianism might demand, because it is not equality itself
that is in need of repair; it is the right to equality and the opportunity
of equality, not the guarantee of it. In looking at the WTO, the libertarian liberal would believe that developing nations should have the
right to compete equally with developed nations, not the guarantee of
44

Id. at 2. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press
1972).
45
Garcia, supra note 39, at 998.
46
GATHII, supra note 42, at 2.
47
Id.
48
Garcia, supra note 39, at 1042.
49
GATHII, supra note 42, at 3.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Garcia, supra note 39, at 1007.
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or right to equal results. Thus, a proponent would favor ways the developing nation could better its position if it so chooses.53
In practice, the two philosophies lead the WTO dispute resolution mechanism to be crafted in two directions. Egalitarian liberalism
so benefits developing nations that it eliminates any incentive to develop further economically because, in the end, all nations are on the
same level. Libertarian liberalism does not consider external factors
that show up in the consequences of a WTO action, and nations are not
able to preemptively act to avoid disputes. Thus, both philosophies
blind the actors to an extent, and a position of compromise would simply result in equalizing disadvantages and advantages. The problem
is that balancing advantages and disadvantages needs to be done subjectively, on a case-by-case basis, but such a structural balance must
be set out objectively.
The consequences of the problem of philosophical approaches
can be illustrated by the following situation. Philosophical dependence has left a gaping hole in WTO treaty interpretation; there is no
judicial precedent for a rule for the DSB.54 The Appellate Body has
adopted a rule, in dubio mitius, or “the less onerous meaning controls,”
but it would only apply if a case were reviewed on the point.55 As a
result, the DSB has had no guidance in interpreting treaty language,
and the Appellate Body is left with a broad rule with questionable application. Both bodies’ decisions have led to contradictions, including
in the case of Article Fifteen of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The Agreement, an implementation of the GATT Treaty in
1994, left open the question of whether developed nations must implement alternate measures against a developing country before applying
anti-dumping duties.56 The agreement says: “Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential
interests of developing country Members.”57 In a 2002 decision
against the United States, the Panel found that Article Fifteen did not
impose any “specific or general obligation on Members to undertake
any particular action.”58 This is an example of a “disempowering characterization”59 that finds a violation based on a non-trade issue, where
53

Id. at 1042.
GATHII, supra note 42, at 6.
55
Id.; see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 107, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
56
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
57
Id.
58
Panel Report, United States—Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on
Steel Plate From India, ¶ 7.110, WT/DS206/R (June 28, 2002).
59
GATHII, supra note 42, at 8.
54
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an alternate interpretation would not have found one. Despite the in
dubio mitius precedent, the disempowering characterization approach
has become the more commonplace interpretation. In a 2000 case involving the European Union and India, however, a panel found otherwise, requiring the European Union to explore potential outcomes of
implementing alternatives to anti-dumping duties.60 It did not confirm the existence of an actual duty under which a violation could be
brought.61 Even assuming that the lack of clear judicial precedent has
not yielded contradiction in this case, a reconciling view is not much
comfort. The lack of a clear judicial precedent renders a measure attempting to assist developing nations entirely impotent.
2. Legal Pragmatism: Theory, Purpose, and Practice
If the two WTO decisions are indeed without contradiction and
are attempting to reach a middle ground, the dependence upon warring philosophies has resulted in policies that fail to assist developing
nations, yet still create additional hurdles through which developed
nations must jump. Essentially, the WTO has perfected finding the
unhappy medium, one that is both unfair and ineffective. The philosophical approach has resulted in simply mitigating inequities so long
as they do not overly burden the other side, and has thus failed to
remedy root problems. A pragmatic approach, whose goal is to make a
system that performs at a predictable and efficient level, stands as an
alternative to a philosophically-guided approach. Rather than trying
to reconcile opposing philosophical views and producing policies, laws
and standards that are the sum of all equals, a pragmatic approach
would be free to embrace an entirely egalitarian consideration of nontrade issues without mandating the employment of certain privileges,
a libertarian preference.
A third philosophical approach, mentioned less often, that
might be confused with legal pragmatism is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is based on the thought of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill.62 Unlike egalitarianism, it advocates redistribution of inequities
based on a morality of consequence, not equality.63 Unlike libertarianism, it is concerned with equality of ends, not just equality of opportunity.64 However, as with egalitarianism, utilitarianism does not
satisfy a tangible goal. Legal pragmatism recognizes that the two
60

Panel Report, European Communities—Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000).
61
Id.
62
See Garcia, supra note 39, at 1002–03.
63
Id. at 1003.
64
Id. at 1007.
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models often diverge, and that in such a case it would be better to
follow the latter.
B. Systematic Unevenness
Legal pragmatism must address several systematic problems
to decide whether the dispute settlement system works fairly. The dispute settlement system is underutilized because costs are too high, the
process functions opaquely, and its decisions are difficult to predict.
Legal standards are nearly impossible to articulate, as evidenced by
the Article Fifteen anti-dumping problem.65 It is harder to determine
whether issues are causes or consequences, because the system’s inherent problems are simultaneously mitigated and aggravated by the
“special and differential treatment” of developing nations.66 Examination of the resulting unevenness reveals a central problem, one that
should be targeted to alleviate the negative results in other issues.
1. Participation in the System
Timothy Stostad examined the impact the dispute settlement
mechanism’s level of judicialization has on developing nations’ participation in the system.67 He concludes that there is evidence of systematic biases within the WTO dispute resolution process that have led to
underutilization by developing nations.68 The question of utilization
of the system must examine not one year, but the trend of participation since the WTO establishment overhauled the system in 1994.
Overall, developing nations have been using the dispute resolution
system more often, though the raw numbers seem to have plateaued.
There were nineteen disputes in 2008, with developing nations as complainants in eleven of those and as respondents in eight.69 This trend
was established in 2005, when developing nations participated in four
out of eleven disputes as complainant or respondent.70 For the past
four years, developing nations have participated in about half the disputes, equally as complainant and respondent. In 2004, however, developing nations comprised just over a quarter of the disputes.71 This
is striking considering about three-quarters of WTO members consider
65

See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
See Dispute Settlement System Training Module, supra note 22.
67
Stostad, supra note 19, at 812.
68
Id. at 834.
69
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Chronological List of Disputes
Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
70
Id.
71
Id. (developing nations participated as five out of nineteen complainants and
five out of nineteen respondents).
66
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themselves a developing nation.72 At the same time, the total number
of disputes has noticeably decreased. In 2002, there were thirty-seven
disputes, followed by twenty-six in 2003, nineteen in 2004, eleven in
2005, and they have remained relatively stable through 2008.73
Regarding the relative increase in the participation of developing nations in the dispute system, Stostad notes that the difference
with the GATT years is actually negligible once one considers such factors as the number of WTO members, the increasing number of areas
in which the WTO regulates, and a general increased trade dependency.74 Eric Posner and John C. Yoo calculated that the total number
of disputes has not increased since GATT, averaging 0.0044 complaints per state per year, compared with 0.0037 complaints per state
per year under GATT, a negligible difference.75 They based their calculation on the number of state pairs possible, using factorial analysis
and eliminating outlier years.76 Regarding the gross decrease in the
amount of cases since 2005, Stostad hypothesizes that nations have
been saving up disputes, anticipating new and better rules at the end
of the Doha Round of negotiation.77
If developing nations are participating at rates relatively equal
to developed nations, though both have dropped off in the past four
years, are they participating enough? Is peaking at nearly half of
WTO cases fair considering, as a whole, they share less of a trade burden than most developed nations? The conclusion seems to be no. Despite the fact that they trade less than developed nations, as threequarters of the WTO membership, developing nations underutilize the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism. As a basic calculation, the costs
do not outweigh the benefits. There are a number of reasons why this
is the case.
Naturally, the costs are comparatively higher for developing
nations. First, in terms of human capital, developing nations are far
less represented at the WTO.78 Stostad estimates that nearly 60% of
72

World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Principles of the Trading
System: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
73
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Chronological List of Disputes
Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
74
Stostad, supra note 19, at 824.
75
Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication 40 (Univ.
Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 206,
2004), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/206-eap-jy.tribunals.pdf.
76
Id.
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Stostad, supra note 19, at 824.
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Id. at 825.
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WTO members are inadequately represented.79 The cost of legal services is higher per dollar (or peso or dong) for developing nations because litigation costs do not increase proportionally according to the
value of the trade barrier.80 For this reason, partially judicializing the
dispute resolution system has increased the costs on developing nations, having to advance the costs of formal litigation. Are the benefits
also higher as to counterbalance the costs? No; in fact, they are lower
than developed nations because of the risk they will be unable to reap
the benefits of winning a dispute. Because the implementation and
enforcement of decisions are not guaranteed, developing nations have
less political capital to force a nation in violation to comply. Thus, it is
less likely that a developing nation will be able to benefit from a successful dispute decision.
If these are barriers, do developing nations actually underutilize the WTO dispute resolution system as a result? The answer is
yes. Despite the fact that the number of disputes brought by developing nations has increased, it is counterbalanced by the gross increase
in the amount of trade done by developing nations.81 Even though developing nations such as China are trading more, their disputes are
still being resolved at a lesser rate than developed nations. “[A] large
poor country doing lots of trade is as likely to be a [disputant] as a
small rich one with the same trade value.”82 The simple dichotomy of
developing and developed nations entirely eliminates any shade of
gray, pigeonholing countries and erasing incentives for gradual
growth. Beyond this, there is no way to determine the extent to which
developing nations are underutilizing the dispute process because
there is no external point of comparison.83
2. Transparency and Predictability of the System
There are consequences that follow underutilization as one
analyzes the fairness of the special and differential treatment of developing nations in the system. While special and differential treatment
attempts to mitigate some of the natural problems for developing nations, such as the costs of legal representation, it does not solve those
problems. At the same time, it makes some natural inequities more
visible and more likely to affect the developing nation’s participation
in the system. Partial judicialization of the system, as will be dis79

Id. at 826.
Id.
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Id. at 828.
82
Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the
GATT? 13 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3133,
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636553.
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Stostad, supra note 19, at 831.
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cussed later, was intended to assist the developing nations with limited political capital. Rather than eliminating the problem of limited
political capital, it instead made the problem a lack of economic
capital.
Beyond underutilization, other issues and complications arise,
particularly transparency and predictability. As the Antidumping
Agreement Article Fifteen problem illustrates, if countries do not bring
disputes to the DSB, no judicial precedent is created. Without judicial
precedent, countries do not know the law and cannot avoid a dispute
preemptively, the ultimate goal of the system. It is a problem of predictability. Without participation in the system, the system will not
become predictable.
Transparency is another complementary complication. Without transparency, nations are unable to understand prior case law to
avoid disputes. The developed nations, interestingly, have most notably pushed for transparency reform. The United States has pushed for
the dispute resolution process to be opened to the public eye, both during the process and after, in document requests.84 The proposal was
presented to the WTO after pressure from Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) with particular concern for the issues of developing
nations, including labor and environmental rights.85 Private attorneys have also advocated such a change so that they can better prepare for disputes.86 That is where transparency becomes
predictability. Additionally, such change would help with the public
view of the legitimacy of the WTO, which is likely to encourage future
participation.87
III. REFORMING FAIRNESS
A. Where: Procedurally
1. Participation and Regularization
Partial judicialization is to blame for a lack of participation and
has made the dispute resolution process less accessible to poorer member states.88 In 2006, Stostad wrote that the root of the problem of
participation lies in the limited judicialization of the dispute settlement system.89 Problems for developing nations in the world of partial
judicialization include the increased complexity of the substantive law,
84

Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 43 (1999).
85
Id. at 44.
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Id.
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Id. at 46.
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Stostad, supra note 19, at 813–14.
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Id.
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a more formal litigation process, and extraordinary costs on the litigants.90 Increased complexity of the law is a result of growing case
law that has begun to stack up as the sum of singular decisions, not in
drawing a picture of the greater law, in the common law sense. This is
the problem with the DSB’s hesitancy to use set standards in evaluating disputes, instead depending on case-by-case compromises. It
would not be a problem if it were not coupled with a formal process
and high costs to use the system.91 Stostad paints a picture of a schizophrenic system: an expensive, formal process that produces binding
compromises.92 The problem with participation results from the confused system that only exists because the DSB is intended to compromise the interests of developing and developed nations and mitigate
natural inequities.93 Philosophical compromise does not solve the
problem of nature; it aggravates it by institutionalizing new inequities. The WTO needs to address these problems to find a proper
solution.
One potential solution is full judicialization of the dispute process.94 Full judicialization would increase the power of the DSB. Such
a recommendation is commendable, but room remains for caution.
Judicialization should not proceed if it is merely to make the system
work like a court in the domestic common or civil law sense. To make
the dispute settlement mechanism more effective, the WTO must address the problems that directly affect the principle of predictability.95
A more promising solution is increased regularization of the dispute
process. The DSB is not a court, and it does not, nor should it, dispense justice; however, by regularizing legal standards and increasing
the transparency of its procedures and decisions, both developed and
developing nations may be better able to avoid disputes and trade
freer and fairer on their own.
Strengthened enforcement of the DSB’s decisions may cause
controversy. Although the consequences of strong enforcement encourage nations to avoid disputes, overzealous enforcement can discourage participation in the system. If the consequences of losing a
dispute become disproportionate to the dispute itself, nations would be
encouraged to work outside of the system. Working outside of the system would undermine confidence in the system as a whole, and an increase in cloudy, back-room deals would be adverse to the rule of law.
90

Id. at 814.
Id.
92
Id.
93
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module:
Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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Here, the difference between the philosophical approaches and legal
pragmatism becomes clear. The balance struck from a compromise between making countries more equal and making countries more free
does not make the system effective. The balance between freedom and
equality is an inescapable problem; the balance struck at a given time
is a product of the values of a society at that time. If the WTO wants
to be a stable force promoting the rule of law in international trade
disputes, fairness should not depend on the relativistic interpretation
of the sum of the world’s values. It must look inward and rely on the
principles it seeks to uphold, including predictability.
There are several specific ways to accomplish the above goals.
First is a mechanism for compulsory compensation.96 Potential developing nation complainants are often dissuaded by initial costs, so compulsory compensation would require respondents to pay a minimal
“benefit-of-the-bargain” amount retroactive to the beginning of litigation.97 This would encourage developed nation respondents to be conservative and measured in their defenses and prevent them from
drowning developing nation complainants in expensive details.98
As for the panel process, the establishment of an independent
prosecutorial system to separate the administrative and judicial aspects could lead to more equitable treatment of issues.99 The current
system is more administrative than judicial, and consequently, there
is no reason for it to be treated as a civil litigation system, in which a
private party brings the suit.100 Some might argue that the DSB
might produce more equitable results if an independent party brings
the action; however, as seen in the United States, “[a]dministrative
agencies . . . conduct quasi-judicial hearings in which both the prosecutor and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) are technically within the
agency’s chain of command but in which neither is permitted to influence the court of the other’s work.”101 In fact, because of the growing
interconnectedness of the global trading world, it has become harder to
characterize an improper trade mechanism as harmful only to the
complaining nation. Furthermore, the creation of public defenders
could lead to more equitable solutions for developing country respondents in dispute settlement actions.102 Rather than replacing the respondent party, this suggestion would simply assist in the great need
96

Id. at 835.
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to lessen the financial and time burdens faced by the respondent developing nations.
The other end of the process could use reform as well. Stostad
argues that the DSU should require mandatory removal of trade barriers deemed improper by the WTO.103 Currently, a winning complainant might not win the removal of a harmful mechanism or even the
payment of appropriate compensation; instead, the WTO may give
them permission to implement an equally harmful mechanism against
the losing respondent.104 Other proposals have circulated, including a
mutual agreement among WTO members to cooperatively act against
a nation found in violation of a WTO agreement.105 As the WTO is not
an entity of its own but a collection of parts, it is important that these
parts are active enough to “[give] the WTO teeth.”106
2. Substantive Development and Transparency
Increasing participation by further regularizing the dispute
settlement process will clear up other issues in the pursuit of predictability. Regularization of the process should extend to the substantive
law of the WTO, with decisions made less on a case-by-case basis and
more by established legal standards. By letting WTO principles more
freely develop as a common law rather than returning to the GATT
system of diplomatic decision-making, regularization would allow nations to more easily predict the results of the procedure and act
preemptively to avoid a dispute. Additionally, regularization would
decrease the need to cloud and hide the decisions of the DSB and increase the need to publish and explain results, thus increasing the
transparency of the proceedings and increasing the predictability of
WTO proceedings.
Robert Hudec emphasizes the need for transparency to complement reform in other areas, particularly participation and better management of the DSB process.107 He notes that there have been
proposals put forward eliminating the confidentiality of many documents, opening DSB hearings to the general public, and those permitting private individuals to submit briefs to both the panels and the
Appellate Body.108 For the United States and other advocates of increased transparency, these proposals are important because they
would bring further legitimacy to the proceedings.109
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 836.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 841.
Hudec, supra note 84.
Id.
Id.
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B. How: Politically
The WTO is, at heart, a political entity, not a judicial one.110 It
is not a government, but a collection of governments, and implementing any reform should proceed with a view toward this existence. Forgetting it is a political entity can create problems, but remembering
this can offer novel solutions. The United States’ push for greater
transparency is but one example of the ways in which the dispute settlement process can be reformed pragmatically, giving developing nations tools to compete as equals. In fact, if legal reform is going to
work, developing nations must reform politically.111 Asif Qureshi suggests scrapping the DSU entirely and drafting a new agreement where
decisions are binding and where the WTO is authorized to monitor
compliance with such decisions.112 He suggests other reforms as well,
to ensure the procedures reach just results.113
Though this comment is about reforming the WTO, developing
nations should be aware of other ways to access the market and compete fairly. Regional and bilateral mechanisms are important to complement participation in the international regime. Whether it is
participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum discussions or a free trade agreement with a fellow developing country, such
development not only increases the nation’s trade, but also helps develop political capital that it can take to the world stage. For instance,
in making economic allies regionally, a developing nation might have
more success in getting a decision of a dispute resolution panel implemented if there are other nations that will support the developing nation against a larger nation in violation of an international trade
obligation. It should be cautioned that dependence on unilateral trade
policies is inherently illiberal and the policies unstable.114 Unilateral
policies should complement a multilateral approach.
Finally, the key pragmatic approach would allow choice application of key philosophical reforms, but not for philosophical reasons.
The WTO should open the conversation about non-trade issues and
emphasize them, not only in dispute resolution proceedings, but
within the Doha Round negotiations. Inclusion of non-trade issues
within formal WTO considerations is fair because it allows policies and
decisions to be created with greater foresight and lasting effect. At the
same time, the WTO should resist the temptation to treat developing
nations differently because they characterize themselves as “develop110

That goes for the Dispute Resolution system as well.
Asif H. Qureshi, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 47 J. AFR. L. 174 (2003).
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ing.” Outside philosophical concerns, such an approach would appreciate the short-term effects of trade policies much more than the longterm effects (considering current conditions without any incentive to
grow), and it does not appropriately treat poorer developed nations or
wealthier developing nations. The proposed approach is fair because it
looks forward and appreciates the details.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Where did this notion of fairness originate? Because the WTO
dispute resolution system is a pseudo-adjudicative system, it dispenses
justice to the extent that the DSB acts as a court. Courts apply the
law when it controls, and they do what is equitable, or fair, when the
law does not control. Traditionally, fairness has been viewed a priori,
as a notion gaining its definition from outside the particular, subjective circumstances of a dispute. Viewing the WTO and its dispute resolution system as a dispenser of a philosophical fairness is a consistent
view, but it is not concerned with what works best when formula and
reality divide. What is misguided about a philosophical view is that it
puts the system in a vacuum and ignores all other political, economic,
and social forces that affect how the WTO can and does work. Pragmatic legalism views the WTO as merely one cog in the international
political economy—one that insists upon doing what works, not just
what should work.
To return to a question posed earlier, of what the members of
the WTO have consented to, it should be self-evident that the members
consented to a particular philosophical point of view. It is likely that
the WTO and its dispute resolution process is intended to be a way of
predictably and efficiently resolving disputes where, hopefully, in the
future, panels might no longer be needed and nations could self-govern
knowing both how a dispute would come out if challenged and how to
avoid a problem becoming a dispute.
[N]o judicial system, no matter how well run, can avoid
the inevitable messiness of politics, and no system will
ever replace diplomacy. Nor should it . . . The WTO must
therefore . . . figure out how to improve its mechanisms
for negotiated solutions, and not automatically resort to
its judges.115
If liberalism is what the WTO strives for, then it is freedom in selfgovernance that is its essence.

115
Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN AFF., 130,
140 (2003).

